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Cox: Fractured Justice

FRACTURED JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF
PRETRIAL JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Prentiss Cox

ABSTRACT
This Article reports on a controlled empirical examination of what
happens when judges exercise their broad discretion to resolve nondispositive pretrial disputes. Experimental studies of judicial decisionmaking are rare, and experimental studies of pretrial dispute resolution
by predominantly state court judges are non-existent. Data was collected
from the presentation of nine simulated disputes about discovery and
litigation management in 166 chambers conferences before 61 volunteer
judges.
The study results indicate that judges faced with the same facts usually
fracture in deciding the dispute. This variation is not attributable to
groups of judges deciding in a consistent way for some parties. Very few
judges showed marked tendencies to defer decisions or rule for one type
of party. Nor did judicial characteristics, such as gender, experience or
measures of ideology, explain the simulation results. These results are
surprisingly consistent with another experimental study on district court
judicial decision-making in criminal sentencing, which found a similar
pattern of fractured outcomes.
The study results also challenge the assumption that the addition of
factors or presumptions in procedural rules produces more predictable
and consistent decision-making, instead finding that the disputes guided
by the vaguest of standards created more agreement among judges than
when the relevant rule contained a multiple factor test or even a
presumptive outcome. Given the varying results when judges exercise
their discretion to determine disputes, changes to the civil procedure
rules to limit judicial discretion advocated by some scholars would
require an upheaval in current judicial decision-making practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental choice in the design of law is when to make a firm rule
and when to allow the exercise of discretion by a judge or jury. Civil
procedure in the United States superficially is composed of rules—hence,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—but is predominantly a collection
of more general standards with a few inflexible commandments. Judges
typically resolve pretrial litigation disputes either by reference to these
standards or by the use of standards to reverse presumptive outcomes in
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the rules.1 With these standards comes the exercise of judicial discretion
in creating decisions in the specific circumstances of each dispute.2
Civil litigation in our courts has evolved from a process designed to
culminate in trial to a series of pretrial events that effectively dispose of
all but a tiny number of disputes. Since the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the number of trials has dropped to a quarter of its
previous level.3 At the same time, non-dispositive pretrial rulings have
increased substantially.4 The importance of pretrial procedure combined
with the broad discretion afforded trial court judges under the civil
procedure rules means understanding dispute resolution outcomes in a
pretrial setting is key to understanding how litigation functions in
practice.
This Article reports on a natural experiment that sheds light on what
happens when judges exercise their discretion to resolve pretrial disputes
about discovery and litigation management. All first-year students at the
University of Minnesota Law School take a course entitled “Law in
Practice.” This course uses simulations to introduce the application of law
to resolve client problems in dispute resolution and transactional matters.
One of those simulations is a chambers conference conducted by judges,
mostly state district court and federal magistrate judges. The judges are
presented with issues designed to reflect typical discovery and other nondispositive pretrial disputes that arise in civil litigation. For this study, we
retained the results of 166 of these simulations resolving 400 pretrial
issues over a seven-year period.
The study here primarily examines whether judges reach consistent
decisions when faced with the same fact patterns, and if not, whether
varying outcomes reflect different approaches to resolving pretrial
disputes or different characteristics or experience of the judges. The
answers to these questions can inform the expectations of litigators about
the predictability of resolving pretrial disputes, contribute to our general
The author is appreciative of guidance from Herbert Kritzer, June Carbone and Paul Vaaler, and for the
research assistance of Scott Dewey and Grant Abrams.
1. See infra Part II.B.
2. Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821, 861 (2018) (observing that
“[t]he soul of the Federal Rules, it might be said, is judicial discretion, and discretion may be the price for
their (relative) simplicity.”).
3. Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial
Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 62 (1995) (establishing that in 1938 the trial rate was “approximately
20% of the cases filed,” but that “by 1990, 4.3% of the filed civil cases resulted in trials.”). But see Herbert
M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting "Trials", 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 415 (2013) (noting
Marc Galanter's research and related scholarship on “the vanishing trial,” and arguing that the reduction
in trials is not as straightforward as prior data suggest, especially when considering state court litigation).
4. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 631, 637 (1994) (observing that “non-dispositive decision making has grown substantially over the
past fifty years, necessitated and created by changes in the rules of procedure.”).
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understanding of how judicial decision-making occurs, and provide
insight into how we shape future amendments to the rules of civil
procedure.
The study results indicate that judges faced with the same facts do not
reach consistent outcomes across multiple issues. Even when decisions
are grouped into four broad categories, only three of the nine issues
decided resulted in a clear majority agreement among the judges on one
outcome category. Some of the issues were resolved with a closely
divided fracturing across all four categories. This variation in outcomes
is not attributable to groups of judges deciding in a consistent way for
some parties. Very few judges showed marked tendencies to defer
decisions or rule for one type of party. Rather, varying outcomes occurred
because judges generally decided multiple simulations based on their own
unique patterns of decisions to defer, rule wholly for plaintiff or
defendant, or reach compromise positions. Nor did judicial
characteristics, such as gender, ideology or experience, explain the
patterns in the simulation results.
This Article provides three contributions to scholarship in the areas of
civil procedure and judicial decision-making. First, it is the only empirical
scholarship examining how judges use chambers conferences to resolve
non-dispositive pretrial disputes, even though such conferences are a
common form of judicial engagement in litigation. The study results show
that judges commonly use chambers conferences to resolve pretrial issues
rather than defer the decision and are as likely to rule for a particular party
as to reach a compromise solution to resolve the dispute.
Second, the study contributes to the empirical literature on judicial
decision-making. The results here are in substantial accord with other
experimental studies evaluating trial level judicial decision-making. In
particular, the study results here are very similar to the decision-making
variation shown in a well-known experimental study in criminal
sentencing. With the exception of a very small number of judges at the
margins, variation in study outcomes reflect judicial differences in
exercise of discretion that do not consistently favor one category of party
over another, but rather show a splintering of results by discrete decisions.
The study results show neither a widely shared consensus about
appropriate outcomes for individual issues nor a clear majority/minority
grouping across issues. Nor do the results of these trial court level
decisions yield to a simple explanation for difference by personal
characteristics or experiences of the judges or proxies for judge ideology.
Third, civil procedure scholars disagree about whether the current
emphasis on judicial discretion in managing civil litigation is preferable
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to a system of more determinative rules.5 This study provides unique
experimental data about how trial court judges use their current broad
discretion in pretrial matters. Because judges reach varying results, and
often reach compromise solutions to the dispute, a transition to a system
of rigid rules will wrought an upheaval in pretrial practice. Furthermore,
the pretrial disputes in the study guided by the vaguest of standards in the
federal rules created more agreement among judges than disputes where
the relevant rule contained a multiple factor test or even a presumptive
outcome. Accordingly, the study results suggest that adding factor tests
and presumptions may not be enough to eliminate varying outcomes;
rather, only explicitly determinative rules with no discretion to depart
would achieve outcome consistency.
This Article describes the simulation experiment and methodology of
data collection, summarizes the simulation results, and looks at the
meaning of these results for understanding our system of pretrial
litigation. Part II discusses the empirical and theoretical scholarship to
which this Article contributes. Part III describes the simulations that form
the study data, the methodology of producing data on the simulation
results, and the study limitations. Part IV presents the results of the study.
Finally, Part V discusses the meaning of the results for scholars of our
litigation system and for judges and attorneys who engage in litigation.
II. SCHOLARSHIP ON JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
The empirical scholarship on judicial decision-making is vast. The first
subpart summarizes existing scholarship and places the study reported
here in a largely unexamined corner of this research. The second subpart
looks at theoretical legal scholarship on trial court decision-making in
discovery and litigation management, with a focus on the policy
implications of allowing trial courts substantial discretion over such
matters.
A. Empirical Scholarship of Judicial Decision-Mmaking
In the late 1940s, political scientist C. Herman Pritchett gathered data
examining ideology as a determinant of Supreme Court case outcomes;
then a heretical notion and now a view widely accepted among average
citizens.6 This scholarship is now produced by social scientists,
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. Herman C. Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 19391941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890 (1941); HERMAN C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (Macmillan 1948). See Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the
Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2017, 2019-22 (2016) (describing Pritchett’s work
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psychologists, legal academics, and more recently by scholars with more
than one of these credentials or affiliations, as faculty holding both a J.D.
and Ph.D. increasingly fill the ranks of the legal academy.7 The animating
concern of ideology explaining federal appellate court decision-making
continues today as a primary focus of empirical legal scholarship.
Underlying this work is a measuring of the realist challenge to the
formalist notion that law dictates a correct result. Although few, if any,
legal scholars would claim today to subscribe to a strict formalist view of
judicial outcomes, the degree to which law creates a clearly correct result
in a given dispute and the particular factors that otherwise account for
judicial resolution of disputes are tested in this vein of empirical
scholarship.8
Scholarship on the influence of ideology has been joined by countless
other empirical studies attempting to explain why and how judges make
the decisions they make, including identifying the explanatory value of
race, gender, and other judicial characteristics on judicial outcomes.9
While study of judicial decisions has grown far beyond ideological
motives, the type of judges studied remains fairly narrow. United States
Supreme Court decision-making studies are voluminous, of course, as are
studies of the decisions of federal appellate judges.10 State courts are less
frequently studied, and the studies that exist mostly concern state
appellate courts and focus substantially on the impact of state judicial
elections on outcomes.11 Similarly, trial court decision-making is less

and the reaction to it). Quinnipiac University Poll (May 2019) (finding 59% of U. S. people polled agreed
that the Supreme Court is “too influenced by politics.”), https://www.pollingreport.com/court.htm
7. Michael Heise, An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990-2009,
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1747-48 (2011).
8. See Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting "Is' and "Ought' in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 117, 146-55 (2013).
9. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 2047-50 (categorizing scholarship on the impact of judicial
characteristics on case outcomes); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative
Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 876 (2008) (describing
empirical work on judicial decision-making); LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (U
of Michigan Press 1997) (describing empirical work on judicial decision-making and including a reference
listing empirical studies on the topic); Neal C. Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building
in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460 (1991);
Joel Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-making, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).
10. Heise, supra note 7, at 838 (“as is generally true with much judicial decision-making literature,
many of the studies, finding ideology as an influential variable focus on the Supreme Court or, to a lesser
extent, federal courts of appeal. Whether any findings of significance in these settings might hold for
judges at the trial court level is unclear.”).
11. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM LANDUS & RICHARD POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES:
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 97-98 (Harvard University Press 2013)
(colleting empirical studies of state court judicial decisions). See, e.g., HERBERT KRITZER, JUSTICES ON
THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (Cambridge University
Press 2015); Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 719 (2010)
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studied. The existing studies focus on federal district court compliance
with appellate directives or criminal sentencing,12 and rely on trial court
opinions, which are primarily issued on merit decisions.13 Studies of
decision-making on disputed issues by state trial court judges in civil
matters are rare.14
Empirical work of matters relevant to the study presented here— how
judges resolve discovery and other pretrial non-dispositive issues—is
limited. Extensive data collection and analysis has been conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center and others using docket data and surveys of
judicial personnel and litigants looking at the burden of discovery on the
courts and litigants, or that relate to case and docket management.15 The
author is unaware of any empirical study of how judges use chambers
conferences to make decisions on pretrial non-dispositive matters in a
chambers conference setting.
Empirical judicial decision-making studies rely mostly on large sets of
data coding the outcomes of written judicial opinions on the merits of a
case. The obvious limitation in this work is that specific case variation
makes it difficult to assert definitively that a particular judge, or even a
group of judges with a particular set of ideological preferences and
personal characteristic, would have reached outcomes different from
judges with opposing preferences and characteristics if given the same
exact cases.16
An alternative approach that addresses these limitations is the use of
(observing that few studies of judicial decision-making employing attitudinal modeling have addressed
state court decision making).
12. See EPSTEIN ET. AL, supra note 11, at 96-97 (colleting empirical studies of U. S. district courts);
Diego A. Zambrano, Judicial Mistakes in Discovery, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 218 (2018) (describing empirical
studies on trial court non-compliance with appellate directives and reporting on a study of compliance by
trial courts with the changes to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
13. Pauline T. Kim et. al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 83, 94-102 (2009) (surveying the literature on district court decision-making, noting that
they predominantly use written opinions, and arguing for a focus on decisions rather than opinions and
for attention to procedural rulings).
14. But see generally KENNETH DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN POLITICS: STATE COURT
POLICY IMPACT AND FUNCTIONS IN A LOCAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (John Wiley & Sons 1967).
15. See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1127-33 (2002) (surveying and describing empirical studies on judicial
pretrial management of cases); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil
Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 788 (1998) (summarizing empirical work on the use of discovery in civil
litigation).
16. Joshua Fischman, Measuring Inconsistency, Indeterminacy and Error in Adjudication, 16 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 40, 42 (2014) (observing that “inconsistency . . . cannot be precisely estimated with the
kinds of observational data that are typically available. Studies that compare rates at which judges reach
various outcomes can only identify a range of feasible levels of inconsistency, even when cases are
randomly assigned. More precise measurement of inconsistency requires data in which judges’ decisions
in the same cases are simultaneously observable.”).
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experimental studies. Experimental studies of courts have included
random case assignment between a control group and cases assigned
using different litigation management practices.17 Psychologists have
used surveys of judges to examine the extent to which well-known
heuristics apply to federal judges as decision-makers.18
The study here lies in a subset of experimental scholarship in which an
identical fact scenario is given to a large number of decision-makers in a
controlled setting. This type of empirical work eliminates the problem
inherent in studies using large sets of data from actual cases in which the
“judges are never observed deciding the same case.”19 Perhaps because
such experimental studies aim to remove case variance as a factor in
differing outcomes, such studies have sought to measure variance in
outcome as a primary purpose of the study, rather than focus on
correlations between judicial characteristics and a series of case outcomes
over time.
The most influential of such work is a 1974 study in which federal
district court judges in the Second Circuit were asked to impose mock
sentencing based on identical pre-sentence reports in twenty cases.20 The
study found substantial variation in sentencing in all but three of the
twenty cases.21 It concluded that the disparity was not substantially
explainable by the judge’s district or the judge’s length of service, and
that while the judges collectively created a broad range of results in each
mock case, only a few judges sentenced consistently in the same
direction.22 This study had a substantial influence on the introduction of
sentencing guidelines in an effort to create uniformity in sentencing
outcomes.23
A similar level of disparity in sentencing was found in an experimental
study in 1977 which presented sentencing files in five cases to forty-seven
Virginia state court judges24 and a 2001 study that asked fifty-two
17. See Willging, supra note 15, at 1127-34 (describing experimental studies by the FJC and others
using differential case assignments).
18. See Chris Guthrie et. al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (2007); J. Rachlinski et. al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230
(2006); Andrew J. Wistrich et. al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2005); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001).
19. Fischman, supra note 8, at 150.
20. Anthony Partridge & William Eldridge, The Second Circuit Sentencing Study: A Report to the
Judges of the Second Circuit 1-4 (1974) (hereinafter “Second Circuit Sentencing Study”).
21. Id. at 38-39.
22. Id. at 23-40.
23. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (citing congressional records indicating that Congress relied
on the Second Circuit Sentencing Study in adopting federal sentencing guidelines).
24. William Austin & Thomas Williams III, A Survey of Judges' Responses to Simulated Legal
Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306 (1977).
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Spanish judges to review the transcript of a single actual rape trial and
impose a sentence.25 A 1984 study in the Netherlands presented nine
mock cases to 114 judges in the civil litigation context and also found
nothing to substantiate the hypothesized explanatory effect of personal
characteristics on outcomes, but the results nonetheless showed variation
in outcomes.26
Experimental studies presenting the same fact pattern to multiple
judges are rare.27 Such research is costly and time-consuming, and
requires obtaining the cooperation of a large number of judges, which
perhaps accounts for its comparatively infrequent use.28 And these studies
come with their own set of limitations, of course. Creating data in
controlled conditions lacks the consequence of reaching outcomes with
the rights of actual people at stake.29 Therefore, the artificial conditions
of the experiment that control for case variations necessarily fail to
replicate the real-world conditions of the decision-maker.
In sum, the study reported here rests in a particularly dark corner of
empirical legal research. It uses experimental data. The decisions studied
are at the trial court level on non-dispositive, pretrial litigation disputes.
The participating judges are predominantly state trial court judges, a
largely unstudied group. And the decisions, or deferrals of decisions,
occur during informal chambers conferences, about which little has been
published in any respect.
B. Scholarship on Trial Court Discretion in Pretrial Matters.
This subpart briefly summarizes the theoretical scholarship on the role
25. Ramon Arce, Francisca Fariña, Mercedes Novo & Dolores Seijo, Judges’ decision-making
from within, published in En R. Roesch, R. R. Corrado & R. J. Dempster (Eds.), Psychology in the courts:
international advances in knowledge 195-206 (Routledge 2001).
26. Peter J. Van Koppen; Jan Ten Kate, Individual Differences in Judicial Behavior: Personal
Characteristics and Private Law Decision-Making, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 225 (1984).
27. Fischman, supra note 8, at 150; Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg Litigation Realities,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 126 (2002) (noting that experimental “methods have long been possible, and
for just as long they have gone rarely employed.”).
28. Clermont and Eisenberg name those conducting experimental studies as “the real heroes of
empirical research,” but describe such research as “a drag,” and note the mismatch between the training
of various types of scholars conducting experimental research on judicial decision-making and the
professional rewards for such research. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 126. Fischman, supra
note 16, at 59 (noting that as to simulated decision-making studies, “judges may be loath to cooperate,
especially if the research could support reforms that the judges oppose.”).
29. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 2071 (“I take the experimental evidence quite seriously, but some
members of the legal community (especially judges) do not; they complain that the experiments are
artificial and do not capture the real courtroom environment.”); Heiss, supra note 7, at 846 (“Whatever
gains might be realized for comparability purposes, however, are off-set by losses in authenticity.”);
Fischman, supra note 16, at 58-59 (collecting scholarship criticizing the validity of simulated decisionmaking studies).
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of trial court exercise of discretion in decision-making on discovery
disputes and other non-dispositive pretrial matters. Legal scholars agree
that pretrial procedure has become more important over time, and they
agree that trial court judges exercise all but unchecked authority to decide
pretrial issues. As Professor Stephen Yeazell has observed, “[c]ourts now
devote the bulk of their civil work to such pretrial tasks: ruling on
discovery disputes, deciding joinder issues, conducting pretrial and
settlement conferences . . . This work is important, required, and often
practically dispositive.”30 And as Professor Yeazell and others have
further elaborated, such decisions are rarely rigorously reviewed at the
appellate level.31
Scholars divide on whether the broad discretion given to trial court
judges to manage litigation in the pretrial phase improves or hinders the
efficient and fair resolution of civil litigation matters.32 This debate
substantially mirrors the well-known scholarship on law as a form of rules
versus standards.33 Advocates for rule-based decision-making express
concern over the competency of judges to make effective pretrial
decisions given their information limits and the strategic maneuvering of
the parties, resulting in unfair or arbitrary decisions that are more costly
to obtain.34 Those inclined toward broad judicial pretrial discretion argue
that this system allows for efficient and fair procedures appropriate to
differing case conditions.35
30. Yeazell, supra note 4, at 639.
31. Id. at 660-64; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1261, 1295 (2010). As Professor Robert Bone put it, “it is only a slight exaggeration to say that
federal procedure, especially at the pretrial stage, is largely the trial judge's creation, subject to minimal
appellate review.” Robert Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007).
32. The scholarship occurs in two over-lapping descriptions: evaluations of whether the Rules of
Civil Procedure should be reformed to limit judicial discretion over pretrial disputes; and whether
“managerial judging,” or proactive judicial involvement in cases, is a worthwhile practice. Both of these
strands of scholarship are cited below.
33. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
As Professor Robert Effron observed, “[t]his tension between the benefits of ex ante rules specification
and ex post decision-making is not susceptible to a unitary solution across all rules and procedural
devices.” Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683, 689 (2014).
34. See, e.g., Thornberg, supra note 31, at 1300 (“[t]he result is a hodgepodge of potentially
inconsistent rulings that vary from judge to judge and case to case.”); Bone, supra note 31, at 1964
(“[R]ulemakers should be much more skeptical of delegating (procedural) discretion to trial judges and
should seriously consider adopting rules that limit or channel discretion more aggressively.”); Todd D.
Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 41, 46 (1995) (arguing as to pretrial litigation management, “that we must limit judges'
unchecked powers or restrain their use of this power.”).
35. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 438 (2007)
(“district courts are in a better position to make decisions regarding the management of litigation.”);
Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2003)
(“[a]lthough this examination confirms the views of the critics that discretionary activity has indeed
increased (in pretrial procedure), I view these developments with less alarm than some others.”).
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The question of judicial discretion in implementing procedural rules is
at the heart of the fairness of those rules in practice. Fairness logically
dictates “that cases with relatively similar facts ought to reach relatively
similar outcomes.”36 As Professor Robin Effron puts it:
The push and pull between the appeal of strict procedural rules with
consistent outcomes and the realities of the costs and practical difficulties
of such rules are reflected in the different attitudes that rulemakers take
toward crafting the rules that implement procedural devices. While there
are some rules in which consistency is deliberately subordinated to other
procedural values, in other instances, the extent to which uniformity should
be enforced or imposed is either unstated or clearly aspirational. It is in
these situations that tensions in interpreting and applying procedural rules
can arise. Although judicial discretion is not the only procedural value to
compete with uniformity, it looms large in the debate ….37

The study presented here provides an empirical reference point for
evaluating this debate by offering experimental data on how judges differ
when actually exercising discretion concerning the same facts and
procedural issue.
III. STUDY METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
This Part explains the Law in Practice course and its simulations from
which the study data was derived. This Part also describes how the data
was coded from the reported simulation results and discusses the study’s
limitations.
A. Law in Practice Chambers Conference Simulations
All first-year students at the University of Minnesota Law School are
enrolled in a course entitled “Law in Practice.” Students engage in a series
of simulations based on two case files—one litigation file, which draws
from the facts of a litigated case, and one transactional file. The facts for
each case file are provided to the students over the course of the semester
on a weekly basis. For the litigation case file, which is of sole relevance
here, the facts are presented in sequence as they would be revealed to the
attorney in a typical litigation matter, starting with the client interview
and then changing as documents and other interviews are conducted and
as information is obtained in discovery.
The course has two components—a “law firm” classroom section and
a smaller “practice group.” A full-time law school faculty member teaches
36. William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1865, 1893 (2002).
37. Effron, supra note 33, at 695.
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the weekly law firm class for a section of students, from forty to fifty
students, in which students learn the law underlying the legal disputes in
the case files and the concepts used in the performance of skills needed in
legal practice. For example, in one of the litigation case files, the class
studies the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
discusses how to analyze the merits of an ADEA claim under the known
facts and circumstances of the litigation file, reads about distributive
negotiating theory, then uses that merits analysis and the negotiating
theory to derive a proposed settlement offer for client consideration.
Students also participate in a “practice group” of approximately eight
students, which is supervised by a practicing attorney acting as an adjunct
instructor of the law school. The primary focus of the practice group is
conducting a series of simulations based on the case files. For the
litigation case file, students conduct a client interview and witness
interview, take and defend a deposition of a third-party witness, argue
issues arising from pretrial disputes before a judge in a chambers
conference, and participate in a mediation conducted by a qualified
neutral. The data for this study are derived from the chambers conference
simulation.
The Law in Practice course has used the following three litigation case
files: (1) the “Flores” file is a joinder case involving a claim of wage
underpayment filed by eleven former janitors against a local grocery
chain for acting as a joint employer in misclassification of the janitors as
independent contractors; (2) the “Aldrich” file is a suit by a smaller
regional bank against a larger bank for fraud by non-disclosure of
information as part of loan refinance by a business borrower; and (3) the
“Muessig” file is an age discrimination suit by a high school art teacher
against a private school. Over the six years in which these files were used
in the course, the Flores file was used once (2018), the Aldrich file was
used twice (2013 and 2016), and the Muessig filed was used four times
(2014, 2015, 2017 and 2019). All of these files area loosely based on the
facts in a reported case.
B. Chambers Conference Simulations
The chambers conference simulations occur after students conduct
interviews and a deposition, and after students received information about
initial discovery responses, including document production, interrogatory
responses, and excerpts from deposition transcripts. This subpart
describes the issues that students were instructed to present for resolution
in the chambers conference and describes the conduct of the chambers
conference simulations by the volunteer judges.
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1. Issues Presented for Resolution in the Chambers Conferences
Each of the three case files present a discrete set of issues to be resolved
at the chambers conference. The issues were designed to reflect typical
pretrial disputes. The number of issues varied for each case file, with four
issues in the Flores case, three issues in the Aldrich case, and two issues
in the Muessig case. Thus, judges determined a total of nine different
issues in the various chambers conference simulations.38
Five of the issues involve a dispute about production of requested
documents resolvable by reference to the “proportionality” standards
provided in Federal Rule 26(b)(1).39 The information requested clearly
was relevant for purposes of discovery, so the question presented to the
judge was whether the requested document production met the
requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) that the request be:
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.40

The other four issues presented a variety of pretrial matters: whether the
eleven plaintiffs in the Flores case should be allowed to amend their
complaint to add three additional plaintiffs after the date indicated in the
Scheduling Order for amending pleadings;41 whether the plaintiff in the
Aldrich case should be allowed to take more than the presumptive limit
of ten depositions;42 whether the court should adopt a protective order
proposed by the defendant in the Aldrich case;43 and whether the judge in
the Muessig case should grant the defendant’s request that the plaintiff
produce her medical records given her request for “garden variety”
emotional damages.
Appendix A describes in more detail the nine issues presented during
the chambers conferences. Table 1 below provides a summary of each of
the nine issues.
38. During the period of the simulations, Minnesota courts employed civil procedure rules on eight
of the nine issues that were materially the same as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Fed.R.
CIV. P. 15(a)(2) and MINN. R. CIV. P. 15.01; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) and MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b)
(conformed to federal rule in 2006). On one issue—the number of permitted deposition—the Federal
Rules use a presumptive limit of ten, FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i), while the analogous Minnesota rules
have no such limit, MINN. R. CIV. P. 30.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
40. Id.
41. Amendment of complaints following the initial pleading period is governed under
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(i) establishes a presumptive limit of ten depositions per side.
43. The grant of a protective order is governed under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
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Table 1: Description of Issues in Chambers Conference Simulations
#

Case

Issue Type

1

Flores

Amend
Pleading

2

Flores

Document
Production
Proportionality

3

Flores

Document
Production
Proportionality

4

Flores

Document
Production
Proportionality

5

Aldrich

# of
Depositions
Permitted

6

Aldrich

Terms of
Protective
Order

Issue
Description
Plaintiff demand
to add three
plaintiffs after
deadline in
Sched Order for
Complaint
amendment.
Plaintiff demand
to produce
requested
outsource
contracts from
other types of
vendors.
Plaintiff demand
to produce
communications
related to above
contracts.
Plaintiff demand
to produce
records of
personnel policy
violations by
employees other
than plaintiffs.
Plaintiff demand
to take more
than ten
depositions.
Defendant
demand for
terms of
proposed
protective order.
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Outcomes
No
reasonable
option exists
for
compromise
on this issue.

Decision for
Defendant
on Issue on
#2
Decision for
Defendant
on Issue #3.

Plaintiff
requests 18.
Defendant
wants 10
limit.
Plaintiff
does not
have clear
position on
desired
outcome

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1

378

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

priorities.
7

Aldrich

Document
Production
Proportionality

8

Muessig

Document
Production
Proportionality

9

Muessig

Document
Production +
Resolution of
uncertain legal
issue

Plaintiff demand
to produce
records of
violations of
defendant
lending policy
with banks other
than plaintiff.
Plaintiff demand
to produce
entire personnel
files of
employees other
than plaintiff.
Defendant
demand for
plaintiff’s
medical records
related to claim
for emotional
distress
damages, with
law unclear on
whether type of
damages claim
matters.

Plaintiff
wants no
production
but be
allowed to
seek “garden
variety”
emotional
damages.
Defendant
wants
records or
drop any
claim for
emotional
damages.

With only one exception, the parties had preferred outcomes on each
of the issues.44 For judges, each issue was designed so that it was
reasonable for a judge to resolve the issue with more than one outcome.
Over the six-year period included in this study, 166 chambers
conference simulations were completed with the participation of 61
judges. The four issues in the Flores case were presented in 24

44. The exception is the plaintiff had no clear position on issue #6 as to what constitutes success
in opposition to the proposed protective order submitted by the defendant. See infra Appendix A.
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simulations; the three issues in the Aldrich case were presented in 40
simulations; and the two issues in the Muessig case were presented in 102
simulations. Thus, judges were presented with a total of 420 issues for
resolution in these conferences. For twenty of these issues, the resolution
was missing on the reporting forms or too incomplete or unclear to code.
Thus, we have data on the resolution of exactly 400 issues presented in
the 166 chamber conferences.45
2. Judge Participation in Chambers Conferences
No procedure or outcome was prescribed for the simulation. Judges
were instructed that “[w]e do not have a prescribed outcome for your
chambers conference. Please handle the matter as is warranted by the facts
presented and the arguments of the students.” For the two case files with
a state court venue, the judges were told that the state civil procedure rules
were identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judges were given
a summary of the issues to be considered in the simulation, the key facts
related to those issues, and relevant case law, if any. Judges were
instructed that “[t]his summary is all that you need to read to adequately
conduct the simulation.” Judges also were given documents provided to
the students that form the basis of the dispute, including pleadings,
communications between counsel, case law, and prior court orders.
Two students for each side appeared before the judge at the chambers
conference. The practice group instructor observed the simulation. Judges
typically engaged in a discussion with the students about the conduct of
the simulation following the formal simulation. The course provided the
participating students with a form identifying each issue that should have
been presented for that chambers conference simulation and asking the
students to state the outcome for that issue. Students from the opposing
sides cooperatively completed these forms and returned them to the
program administrator.
The judges overwhelmingly were trial courts judges, including fortytwo state district court judges, five federal magistrate judges; five state
court referees; one federal district court judge; and two administrative law
judges. The remaining six judges mostly were from state appellate courts.
The mean tenure of the judges was ten years and the median tenure was
eight years, with a range from one to thirty-two years on the bench.

45. One of the 61 judges conducted only one simulation and both of the issues presented to this
judge were among the 20 issues we were unable to code. Therefore, the data presented here is recorded
for 60 judges rather than 61 judges.
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C. Study Issues and Data Analysis
This study looks primarily at the extent to which judges diverge in
deciding the same discovery and other pretrial, non-dispositive issue
when presented with the same fact pattern and law in the context of a
chambers conference. The course provided the participating students with
a form identifying each issue that should have been presented for that
chambers conference simulation and asking the students to state the
outcome for that issue. Students from the opposing sides cooperatively
completed these forms and returned them to the program administrator.
The data on simulation results used in this study was derived exclusively
from these forms. The results for each issue in each simulation were coded
into numerous specific outcomes that commonly occurred for each issue.
These results were then grouped into the following four broad
categories:46
(1) plaintiff prevailed (i.e., plaintiff achieved its desired outcome);
(2) compromise (i.e., the result was not the outcome desired by either
party);
(3) defendant prevailed (i.e., defendant achieved its desired outcome); or
(4) the judge deferred a decision on the issue.47

In addition, this study examined whether differences in outcomes could
be explained by identifiable characteristics of the judges making the
decision, which is the type of causative question of concern in most
empirical studies of judicial decision-making. To answer this question,
data was coded on the following thirteen characteristics of each of the
judges who participated in the simulations: number of years in judicial
office; whether the judge is currently on the bench or retired; the
particular district court for state trial court attorneys; gender; race; prior
attorney employment as a prosecutor, public defender, non-profit
attorney, civil government attorney, legislator, or attorney in a major law
firm;48 the governor or president who appointed the judge, and the party
of the appointer, if any; and a measure of ideological affiliation based on

46. For 20 of the 364 issues that were to be presented at the chambers conference, no outcome
within these four categories occurred and thus these 20 issues were excluded from the results. The reasons
for no recordable outcome included the following: the issue not discussed by the students at the simulation;
the students resolved the issue without direction by the judge; the judge took no recordable action; or the
response on the form was unclear. We also coded whether the judge sua sponte discussed settlement of
the case with the parties.
47. Judicial deferral of the issue took the following forms: the judge directing the parties to
continue discussions on the matter in an attempt to resolve, the judge took the issue under advisement, or
the judge directed the parties to file a motion or otherwise submit briefs on the matter.
48. A major law firm was defined as a law firm with more than 100 attorneys in 2018, regardless
of when the judge was part of the firm. For judges who worked for law firms that have merged, the number
of attorneys in the surviving firm was used.
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publicly available data on contributions to candidates for elected office.
All of this information was obtained solely from publicly available data.49
D. Study Limitations
Two obvious limits for the use of the study data are: (1) that it is a
simulation and thus an artificial environment, and (2) that students
appeared at the chambers conference and made arguments of varying
substance and quality that influenced the outcome.
The former limitation mostly is what it is; experimental studies have
the advantage of presenting the same case to multiple judges and the
disadvantage of an artificial environment. Two factors, however, weigh
in favor of the accuracy of these results for real events compared to other
experimental studies. First, unlike the other experiential studies, the
chambers conference simulations attempted to mimic an actual litigation
event rather than present a paper case file. Also, unlike other experimental
studies, there is some consequence here, albeit evaluation of students
rather than real consequence for litigants or the public.
The presence of students, however, may exacerbate the second
limitation regarding the relative impact of student argument on the
outcome. Unlike other experimental simulation studies, judges could be
influenced by student arguments even though the underlying facts for
each like simulation are the same. Yet this could be seen as creating a
more realistic setting because it parallels actual practice. Attorneys appear
at chambers conferences and argue for positions, thus influencing
outcomes.50
IV. STUDY RESULTS
This Part presents the study results in three subparts. The first subpart
presents an overview of the results. The second subpart provides data
illuminating the degree of variation among judges as a determinant of
these results. The third subpart looks at whether this variation can be

49. Biographical data was available on court websites for all state and federal court judges in
Minnesota allowing to code all of the fields for all of the judges other than the data on political
contributions. The data used for the political contribution field was derived from Adam Bonica, Database
on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections: Public version 2.0, STAN. UNIV. LIBRARY (Mar. 11, 2016,
2:01 PM) (“DIME”), https://data.stanford.edu/dime. Data was extracted from the DIME database for
political contributions from 1980 through 2014. Data for this field was available only for 29 of the 61
judges.
50. The author’s discussions with the many practicing attorneys who supervise the chambers
conference simulations provides anecdotal support for the conclusion that the volunteer judges attempt to
create an experience similar to a chambers conference in an actual case, as stated in the instructions to the
judges.
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explained by characteristics of the judges.
A. Overview of Results
Table 2 provides the simulation results by issue for the four categories
of outcomes.
Table 2: Outcomes by Four Categories by Issue
Plaintiff
Prevails
Issue #1
(n=23)
Issue #2
(n=24)
Issue #3
(n=22)
Issue #4
(n=23)
Issue #5
(n=37)
Issue #6
(n=40)
Issue #7
(n=39)
Issue #8
(n=97)
Issue #9
(n=95)
TOTALS
(n=400)

Compromise Defendant
Prevails

Deferred
Decision

74%

0%

17%

9%

25%

25%

25%

25%

9%

18%

50%

23%

17%

35%

22%

26%

16%

65%

16%

3%

0%

50%

23%

28%

3%

44%

21%

33%

22%

67%

0%

11%

50%

20%

20%

10%

105
26%

163
41%

68
17%

64
16%

The overall variation in results is greater than apparent in the summary
data because the compromise category is broadly constructed to capture
any outcome that is not a ruling wholly for one of the parties or a deferred
decision. Issue #5 provides an easy example because the results are
numeric. The parties were disputing the number of depositions that would
be allowed for the plaintiff. The defendant sought the default limit set in
Rule 30, which is ten depositions.51 The plaintiff sought a total of eighteen
depositions. For the thirty-nine simulation decisions reported here, three
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i).
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were deferred outcomes and the remaining thirty-six simulation results
were as presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Number of Depositions Allowed as Outcome of Issue #5

# of Outcomes
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B. Examining Variation of Outcomes by Judge
This subpart examines the question of whether the variation in
outcomes is a result of groups of judges consistently reaching the same
decisions compared to other groups of judges. Variation in judicial
decision-making was measured in three ways: variations in propensity to
defer decisions, variation in decisions that favored plaintiff or defendant
relative to the mean decision of all judges on the issue; and the likelihood
of the judge determining the case consistent with the plurality. Each of
these types of variation are explained below. In short, outcome variation
is not substantially attributable to some judges consistently deferring or
ruling in one direction, although there are a few judges that showed such
tendencies.
1. Deferral of Decisions
Deferrals accounted for 64 of the 400 decisions, or 16%. Thirty-one of
the sixty judges, or about half, did not defer on any decision. Thirty-three
judges decided five decisions or more, and only six (18%) of these judges
deferred more than one-third of decisions. These six judges accounted for
twenty-two (34%) of the total of sixty-four deferrals.
Table 3 shows the number of judges who deferred by the total number
of decisions made by the judge.
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# of Decisions
by Judge

Table 3: Number of Judges by Percentage of Deferral Decisions
by Total Number of Decisions

<5 (n=27)
5-10 (n=16)
>10 (n=17)
TOTAL

% of Decisions Deferred
0%
7-24%
25-33%
20
0
4
4
6
2
7
5
3
31 (52%) 11 (18%) 9 (15%)

34+%
3
4
2
9 (15%)

2. Variation by Decision in Favor of Plaintiff or Defendant
Second, the data show only a few judges who made decisions that
heavily lean toward the plaintiff or defendant. To evaluate this type of
variation, each decision was coded as 1 if ruling wholly for defendant, 0
for a compromise or deferral, and -1 if the decision was wholly for the
plaintiff. For each issue, the average score was calculated. Then, for each
issued decided by a judge, the deviation from the average score for all
judges deciding the issue was calculated. The “mean variation score” for
each judge was the mean of the deviation scores across all of that judge’s
decisions. This method of evaluating variation roughly corresponds to the
analysis used in the Second Circuit Sentencing study.52
For example, on issue #9, 48 judges decided wholly in favor of
plaintiff, 28 judges reached a compromise decision or deferred decision,
and 19 judges decided in favor of defendant. The mean score for this issue
was -.3053, calculated as follows: [(48*-1)+(28*0)+(19*1)]/[48+28+19].
A judge received a variation score for that issue as follows: a decision in
favor of a plaintiff received a score of -.6947, a compromise or deferred
decision received a score of .3053, and a decision in favor of defendant
received a score of 1.3053. Therefore, the sum of all judges scores was 0.
A judge who decided ten issues with a summed variation score of 1.74
would receive a mean variation score of .174 per issue.
A judge consistently deciding for plaintiffs or defendants would have
a score of about one or minus one, depending on which issues they
decided. For example, the mean scores on issue #5 through issue #9 were
0.0, .2250, .1795, -.2165, and -.3053. A judge deciding only these five
issues and resolving each in favor of the defendant would have a mean
variation
score
of
1.0235,
calculated
as
follows:
[(1+.7750+.8205+1.2165+1.3053)/5].

52. Second Circuit Sentencing Study, supra note 20, at 36-37.
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Figure 2 shows the mean variation score per issue for each judge who
decided at least five issues. Only four of the thirty-three judges (12%) had
a mean variation score by issue of greater than .3 or lesser than -.3. Of the
seventeen judges with more than ten decision, only one (6%) had a mean
variation score by issue of greater than .3 or lesser than -.3.
Figure 2: Mean Variation Score Per Decision for Each Judge with 5
or more decisions

28

Score for Each Judge

25
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10
7
4
1

-0. 60

-0. 40

-0. 20

0.00
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0.40

0.60

Mean Variation Score Per Issue Decided

3.

Agreement with Plurality

A third question one can ask regarding variation is whether the
differing outcomes reflect one group of judges consistently agreeing and
the remaining group consistently reaching a minority decision. Again, the
data does not show this pattern. To evaluate this type of variation, a
plurality result was identified for each issue and then a judge’s result for
each issue was compared to determine if the judge reached the plurality
result on that issue.
Judges reached a plurality result in 210 of the 400 issues determined,
or 53% of the decisions. Considering only the judges with five decisions
or more, the result is the same: 53% (176 out of 331) of those judges
reached the plurality decision. No judge making five decisions or more
reached the plurality outcome on all issues, and only one judge making
more than five decisions failed to reach a plurality outcome on any issue.
Twenty-three of the thirty-three judges (70%) agreed with the plurality in
40% to 70% of the cases.53

53. Interestingly, there was no overlap between the ten judges who did not fall in this 40% to 70%
range and the four outlier judges with mean variation scores of more than .3 or less than -.3 noted in the
prior subpart.
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C. Relationship between Outcome Variation and Judicial
Characteristics
No statistically significant relationship was found between the
simulation outcomes and any of the identified characteristics of judges.
Neither proxies for ideology,54 the gender or race of the judges, nor prior
employment of the judges showed a significant relationship to the
simulation outcomes. Perhaps more surprisingly given the focus on
pretrial disputes, neither the number of years on the bench nor the type of
judgeship held offered a viable explanation for the varying simulation
outcomes.
A chi-square test was run to determine if there was a statistically
significant relationship at the .05 significance level between the outcomes
of the simulations and the thirteen categories of data gathered reflecting
judicial characteristics and experience.55 The test was run for the decision
on whether to defer for overall deferral percentage and also for each of
the nine individual issues and found no statistically significant
relationship with the thirteen categories of data reflecting judicial
characteristics and experience. The test was then run for the three
categories of decision when the judge did not defer (pro-plaintiff,
compromise, pro-defendant) for each of the nine individual issues, and
found only one of these 117 tests showed any statistically significant
relationship.56 The judicial characteristics also were tested against the
derived measures for outcome variation totaled across all nine issues and
no statistically significant relationship was found.
V. ANALYSIS AND MEANING OF STUDY RESULTS
This Part elaborates three contributions from this study for legal
scholarship. Subpart A looks at the meaning of the study results for
understanding how chambers conferences work to resolve discovery
issues. Subpart B notes the similarity of the finding on outcome variance
as compared to other experimental studies of judicial decision-making in
different contexts. Subpart C discusses the relevance of this experiment
for the civil procedure scholarship on whether to limit judicial discretion
in pretrial matters.

54. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for data used to measure ideology.
55. See supra Part III.C. for a list of the thirteen categories of data.
56. Judges with private practice experience were more likely to make a pro-plaintiff decision on
Issue #9. This result seems anomalous and likely to have little explanatory value in and of itself.
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Chambers Conferences Result in Decisions on Pretrial Issues

Litigators regularly engage in chambers conferences to resolve
discovery and litigation management disputes.57 Yet no research appears
to exist concerning how judges conduct such conferences. The study
findings here suggest two conclusions about how judges resolve pretrial
non-dispositive disputes in chambers conferences.
First, judges routinely direct outcomes when the parties appear before
them in informal chambers conferences rather than just set the table for
later resolution. Only sixteen percent of the conferences ended in a
deferred decision, even when deferral was broadly defined to mean
anything from telling the parties to work out a result to scheduling a
motion hearing to decide the matter. And, deferral of decisions was not
substantially attributable to the decisions of a few judges averse to making
a decision.
Second, judges are not shy about directing a result for one party in
chambers conferences. Litigation events that present the court with a
decision on the merits generally require a binary choice, such as a grant
or denial of summary judgment motion, or affirmance or reversal on
appeal. Chambers conferences, on other hand, typically present issues that
allow for a compromise ruling. Nonetheless, judges in the study were
about equally likely to direct a compromise decision as to decide wholly
for one party or the other. Judges wholly accepted the plaintiff’s position
or the defendant’s position in 43% of the simulations (plaintiffs prevailing
in 26% of the conferences and defendants prevailing in 17% of the
conferences); compromise decisions constituted 41% of the outcomes.
Decisions for one party or other outnumbered compromise for five issues;
compromise decisions outnumbered decisions wholly for one party in the
other four issues.
B. Variation in Chambers Conference Outcomes Show Similar
Patterns to Other Experimental Studies of Judicial Decision-making
Even when considering the results at the level of four broad categories
of decisions, the judges directed widely varying resolutions on each of the
nine issues presented. Judges reached a clear majority result (51% or
more) in three of the nine issues presented. On three other issues, half of
the judges reached the same outcome.58 In the remaining three issues, the
judges did not reach even a 50% level of agreement among the four
57. Peterson, supra note 3, at 67. (“Judicial management of the pretrial process entails early and
multiple pretrial conferences . . .”).
58. In two simulations, exactly half of the judges reached the same result, and in a third simulation
50.5% reached a common result.
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categories. Notably, on issue #2, 24 judges split evenly among the four
options.
In addition to failing to consistently reach a common outcome, judges
typically fractured as to the non-plurality result. On issue #9, for example,
forty-eight of the ninety-five judges (50.5%) decided for the plaintiff, but
the remaining forty-seven decisions were spread out among the other
three categories, with nineteen decisions each for compromise and for the
defendant, and nine deferrals. Of the thirty-four possible outcomes over
all the issues,59 only one—ruling for the defendant on issue eight—was
not a result that occurred in the simulations.
Using variation from the mean as a measure of judicial decisions in
favor of plaintiff or defendant, as described above, it appears that while
judges reach varying results on individual issues, they do so primarily by
deciding relatively favorably for plaintiffs in some cases and relatively
favorably for defendants in other cases. The aggregate result is that the
total variation from the mean score for an overwhelming number of
judges hovers near zero. There are a few outliers, as shown in Figure 2.
Two of the thirty-three judges with five or more decisions had notably
higher scores, indicating a pro-defendant slant, and at least one of the
judges had a particularly high negative score, indicating a pro-plaintiff
slant. But the variation mostly reflects decisions in different directions on
various issues that average out to scores, with little indication of a strong
overall slant in favor of either the plaintiff or defendant across multiple
determinations.
The result of substantial variation in outcomes when judges decide the
same simulated dispute is consistent with the finding of other
experimental studies. In the Second Circuit Sentencing Study, the authors
found “a wide range of disagreement among Second Circuit judges about
the appropriate sentences in the twenty cases. Substantial disagreement
persists, moreover, even if the extremes of the distribution are ignored.”60
In the study of Spanish judges asked to determine the merits of a criminal
trial, the researchers found that, “[s]trikingly, of the 52 judges under
study, half reached a not-guilty verdict, and the other half a guilty
verdict.”61 And the Virginia sentencing study concluded that “it is clear
that when legal cases are equalized within offense categories, judges still
show substantial disparity on all three criteria,” with the criteria being
verdict, sentencing mode, and magnitude of penalty.62
59. There were four outcomes for nine issues, which would result in thirty-six outcomes, but two
of those outcomes (finding a compromise on issue #1 and ruling for plaintiff on issue #6) were not possible
due to the design of the simulation problem. See infra Appendix A.
60. Second Circuit Sentencing Study, supra note 20, at 9.
61. Arce, et. al., supra note 25, at 200.
62. Austin & Williams, supra note 24, at 309.
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Perhaps more importantly, the simulation results here are remarkably
similar to a key finding of the Second Circuit Sentencing Study. In that
study, judges were ranked against each other from most lenient to most
severe for each case file on which they imposed a hypothetical sentence.63
The researchers then averaged the judges ranks in an attempt to determine
“whether the disparity observed is a function of some judges habitually
rendering relatively severe sentences while others habitually render light
ones.”64 They found that “most of the judges had average ranks quite
close to the center,” although there were a few outliers. The researchers
concluded that:
The overwhelming majority of the Second Circuit judges are sometimes
severe relative to their colleagues and sometimes lenient. If there are
indeed "hanging judges" and lenient ones -- and it would appear that there
are a few -- their contribution to the disparity problem is minor compared
to the contribution made by judges who cannot be so characterized.65

The finding of a total lack of statistically significant correlation
between the varying judicial outcomes and the thirteen characteristics
coded for each judge is also consistent with other empirical studies of trial
court decision-making. While studies have found one or more of these
factors to have explanatory value for judicial outcomes, studies also show
less discernible influence of ideological or personal characteristics on
judicial decision-making at the trial court level.66 As Michael Heise
summarized this research, “precisely when lack of comparability is
reduced by holding to a case-specific scenario, political affiliation as a
predictor declines.”67
C. Reform of Civil Procedure to Reduce Judicial Discretion Would
Substantially Disrupt Current Practice
The study results have at least two implications for the scholarly debate
between the advocates of civil procedure rules with high levels of judicial
discretion and those seeking to restrict that discretion. First, the high level
of decisional variance suggests that limiting judicial pretrial discretion
would be a wrenching process. Second, adding nudges and presumptions
to the Rules may not do much to obtain the results desired by those who
prize consistency in outcomes.

63. Second Circuit Sentencing Study, supra note 20, at 36-40.
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id.
66. Herbert Kritzer, Polarized Justice? Changing Patterns of Decision-Making in the Federal
Courts, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 309, 356-57 (2019).
67. Heise, supra note 7, at 838.
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1. Limiting Discretion Will Not Come Easy
The clear finding of the study is that it is not the case that judges faced
with the same issue and facts will reach the same result. This may be seen
as support for a concern about arbitrarily uneven outcomes in application
of the civil procedure rules. But this fracturing also means that imposition
of a rigid set of decision-making rules would be a notable change from
current pretrial practice. Advocates of consistent outcomes would have to
accept that developing more determinative rules likely would result in an
upheaval—for better or worse—in pretrial litigation outcomes.
A rule with a clearly determined outcome may be even more disruptive
than just reversing a fractured result because the bright-line rule may be
the exact opposite of the majority judicial position when exercising
discretion. For example, issue #1 presented the problem of whether a
plaintiff should be allowed to amend a complaint after expiration of the
date for pleading amendment in the court’s scheduling order. Unlike
seven of the nine issues, there were only three possible outcomes on this
issue because a compromise result was not a reasonable position.68 Issue
#1 resulted in the highest percentage agreement, with 74% of judges
accepting the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint. The obvious
bright-line rule here, however, is to prohibit further complaint amendment
after the scheduling order deadline—a position taken by just 17% of the
judges.
Another reason to pause in considering adoption of rigid pretrial rules
is the large number of compromise decisions. In addition to the 41% of
decisions resulting in compromise, another 16% of decisions were
deferrals. For example, two different files contained a dispute over the
production of personnel records of employees not directly involved in the
claims at issue. The defendants in both files argued that production of the
records intruded on employee privacy concerns and was too costly. The
plurality result was a compromise in both files, but one file (issue #4)
showed a close fracturing across all four categories while the other file
(issue #8) showed a strong majority for compromise with none of the
ninety-seven decisions for the defendant—the only possible result among
the nine issues for which no judge decided. It is difficult to imagine a
bright-line rule, even one specific to production of personnel records in
litigation, that would not constitute a disruption of these outcomes. Such
a rule might direct an outcome for one party or the other or it might adopt
one version of a compromise reached, but it almost certainly would
involve a wholesale overturning of these results.

68. See infra Appendix A.
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2. Presumptive and Detailed Rules May Not Do Much to Restrict
the Exercise of Discretion in Pretrial Rulings
The results of this study also suggest that trying to reach more
predictable outcomes through nudges and presumptions might be futile.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are uneven in permitting judges to
exercise discretion employing broad standards versus precise rules. In
some decisions, judges are given only the vaguest standards for their
decisions, thereby explicitly granting the judge broad discretionary
authority. For example, pleading amendment after initial filings is
allowed over the objection of an opposing party “when justice so
requires.”69 Judges make other pretrial decisions under standards that
prescribe certain factors to consider but provide discretion to weigh these
considerations as they see best in directing an outcome. Most discovery
disputes present a question of proportionality for which the trial court is
directed to apply a six factor test.70 Finally, judges sometimes exercise
discretion only when asked to reverse a presumptive outcome prescribed
in the rules, such as a request to allow a party to take more than ten
depositions and serve more than twenty five interrogatories absent
opposing party agreement.71 A mix of these types of discretionary
decisions exists in the issues determined in the study simulations.
Judges are notoriously averse to limits on their exercise of discretion,
“particularly in this area of managing the cases that come before them.”72
Judges in the study results reported here did not appear to be constrained
in exercising that discretion when confronted with an issue that required
application of a civil procedure rule containing a specific presumption or
detailed criteria.
Issue #5 required the judges to determine whether the plaintiff could
exceed the presumptive limit of ten depositions found in Rule 30(a)(2),
which is permitted if the judge determines that doing so is consistent with

69. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
72. Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court
Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 44–45 (2005). Judicial resistance to limits on discretion has been observed
a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the
Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 617 (2002) (“[t]he ineffectiveness of duly enacted statutes and court
rules in ensuring the validity of juvenile waivers demonstrates the resistance of juvenile court judges to
externally imposed limits on their discretion.”); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1719-21 (1992)
(describing the negative reaction of federal district court judges to the imposition of criminal sentencing
guidelines); Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys,
76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 935–36 (1992) (“. . . judges steadfastly have resisted imposing limits upon grand
jury secrecy, discretion to cast a wide investigative net, and prerogative to act free of outside
interference.”).
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Rule 26(b) principles. Only six of the thirty-seven (16%) of judges upheld
the presumptive limit of ten depositions, with another six allowing the
plaintiff’s request of eighteen depositions and twenty-four judges finding
a compromise number of depositions between the two positions.
Professor Robert Bone, an advocate of constricting judicial pretrial
discretion, employs the following example involving the ten deposition
limit to raise this question about the impact of judicial discretion in
determining pretrial disputes:
The idea of including express numerical limits is sound, but making them
presumptive and thus allowing exceptions undermines the strictness of the
rule and interferes with the ability of parties to credibly pre-commit. Of
course, the extent of interference depends on how readily trial judges grant
exceptions, and it is difficult to know for sure how often this happens …
In fact, if it turned out that trial judges actually granted exceptions only
rarely, that fact would tend to support a strict rule, since a strict rule would
get it right virtually all the time and also save the litigation costs of
determining individual exceptions.73

While the study results do not answer the question of how often judges
would be willing to depart from the deposition limit across a range of fact
patterns, the results reported here show that at least in one simulated
circumstance, few judges adhered to the rule presumption when presented
a case with reasonable arguments for each side.
Other issues determined in the simulations similarly provide a
suggestion that judges were no less likely (and perhaps more likely) to
exercise discretion with varying results when applying rules that set forth
detailed decision-making criteria. Of the remaining eight issues, the two
decisions requiring application of a general principle created more
agreement than the six issues requiring application of a rule with detailed
criteria. Issue #1 invoked the Rule 15(a) standard that “[t]he court should
freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.” Issue #6 concerned
a request for a protective order, which under Rule 26(c) may issue if the
court “for good cause” determines that it is needed to “protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.” These simulation issues required construing general principles
that provide maximum discretion and minimum express direction to the
trial court judge. The results on these two issues showed more than usual
agreement among the decision-makers, with issue #1 resulting in the
highest percentage common result (73.9%) and issue #6 resulting in the
median percentage common result (50.0%).74
73. Bone, supra note 31, at 2008.
74. Both issues were designed to give reasonable arguments for each side, but issue #1 did not
allow for a reasonable compromise result and no judge reached a compromise result, and issue #6 did not
allow for a clear result in favor of plaintiff and so no such result was recorded. That these two issues
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The remaining six issues involved some variant of a discovery
“proportionality” dispute, which required application of six factors
identified in Rule 26(b)(1) to determine whether to allow the party to
obtain discovery.75 Overall, these issues produced the most disagreement
among the judges, accounting for all three of the issues resulting in less
than a 50% common result. One of these six issues, issue #9, combined
presentation of an uncertain legal issue as a predicate to determining the
discovery proportionality issue, and that issue resulted in 50.5% of the
decisions determined for plaintiff.
There are two reasons to be cautious in reaching conclusions about the
generalizability of these particular results. First, comparing one set of
issues here to another set of issues is apples and oranges, as the underlying
fact patterns and equities likely have more to do with variation in
outcomes than any purported limits on discretion in the civil procedure
rule applicable to the dispute. Second, the best example above—the tendeposition limit—is the one situation relevant here in which Minnesota
state civil procedure rules differ from the federal rules, as Minnesota
courts have no analogous limit on the number of depositions. Although
judges were instructed to apply the federal rules and students were
instructed to argue the existence of the federal rule limit, it may be that
the state court judges who filled most of the ranks of volunteers for the
simulations applied the state rules with which they are familiar. However,
of the thirty-seven judges conducting this simulation, four were federal
judges and all four of these judges reached a compromise result rather
than adhering to the ten-deposition limit.
Limitations noted, the study results provide some evidence that nudges
and presumptions may not do much, or do anything, to obtain the results
desired by those who prize outcome consistency. Judges given discretion
may make little distinction between deciding an issue under a general rule
providing discretion and deciding an issue with a set of factors or a
presumption that ultimately still allow for judicial exercise of discretion.
Experimental studies designed around this particular question would be
useful.
V. CONCLUSION
This experimental study presents data from a robust set of 400 pretrial
effectively had three options instead of four likely skewed the results in favor of higher levels of
agreement.
75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access
to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”
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issues decided in 166 simulated chambers conferences presenting nine
disputed issues. The results provide an empirical look at how judges
conduct chambers conferences, and how judges vary in resolving
discovery and other non-dispositive pretrial disputes. While practices
vary, judges overwhelmingly use chambers conferences to resolve the
disputed issues presented rather than postponing determination of the
issue. The resolutions observed include both compromise results and
rulings wholly in favor of one party or the other. Consistent with other
experimental studies on judicial decision-making, judges vary widely in
determining outcomes. Those disparities, however, are not explainable by
groups of judges consistently ruling in an opposing direction or manner.
Nor is the outcome variation explainable by reference to judicial
characteristic or experience. These results should be useful to scholars of
civil procedure and to attorneys who engage in litigation in our public
courts.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF NINE SIMIULATION ISSUES
A. Flores Simulation
Flores Simulation: Joinder of 11 former janitors who cleaned stores for
a local grocery store chain claiming that grocer was joint employer with
janitorial services company that hired the janitors and classified them as
independent contractor.
Issue #1: Plaintiffs seek to add three additional former janitors as
plaintiff in the lawsuit by filing a Third Amended Complaint. The
deadline in the Scheduling Order for complaint amendment has passed by
more than two months. Defendant consented to two prior amended
complaints to add plaintiffs prior to the expiration of the Scheduling Order
deadline, but objects to this amendment as untimely. A compromise
solution on this issue was not substantially viable option because the three
putative plaintiffs were all similarly positioned relative to the litigation
and delay would exacerbate the harms claimed by Defendant from
allowing amendment.
Issue #2: Plaintiffs demand production of written contracts with thirdparty service providers for the Defendant. Plaintiffs seek the contracts to
show the difference in supervision and control of the workers for the
janitorial services company and the workers for the other third-party
service providers. Defendant objects that these documents are
confidential commercial information and it would be burdensome to
produce because it has over 30 such contracts with multiple versions
operative at different times for the same service.
Issue #3: Plaintiffs demand production of documents that reflect
communications from or to Defendant concerning the terms of or
negotiations concerning any contract produced in response to the request
identified in Issue #2. Accordingly, a ruling wholly for Defendant on
Issue #2 (i.e., no documents will be ordered to be produced) necessitates
a ruling wholly for Defendant on Issue #3.
Issue #4: Plaintiffs demand production of documents that identify a
disciplinary action or other negative evaluation of job performance taken
against employees of Defendant performing janitorial duties. Defendant
objects to the request as burdensome and raises privacy concerns on
behalf of its employees whose records would have to be revealed.
------------------Aldrich Simulation: Smaller regional bank sues larger bank for fraud
by failing to disclose as part of loan refinance that business borrower and
its principal were engaged in fraud.
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Issue #5: Plaintiff seeks to take eighteen depositions, which is eight
over the limit of ten in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Plaintiff has deposed four
individuals to date and has noticed but not completed three depositions of
three other people. Plaintiff has identified to Defendant and the court
eleven other people it wants to depose. Defendant views these depositions
as a burdensome “fishing expedition” and will not consent.
Issue #6: Plaintiff demands Defendant’s commercial lending policies.
Defendant is willing to provide these policies only if Plaintiff agrees to
tight restrictions on their use in a draft protective order provided by
Defendant. Plaintiff does not consent to Defendant’s proposed protective
order, but also does not present a clear alternative to that order, and thus
there is no wholly pro-plaintiff decision possible on this issue.
Issue #7: Plaintiff demands all Defendant documents that identify “any
action taken by Defendant that violates the Defendant commercial
lending policy.” Defendant refuses to produce these documents for two
reasons: burden and confidentiality. Defendant estimates that it will cost
in excess of $500,000 to conduct a thorough review of its records to
identify all documents relevant to this request.
B. Muessig Simulation
Muessig Simulation: Fired teacher sues private high school for
violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
Issue #8: Plaintiff demands Defendant produce the entire personnel file
for all teachers who did not possess a master’s degree. This information
clearly is relevant because Plaintiff was fired for not possession a master’s
degree. Defendant has previously produced a spreadsheet with
information about each of its teachers’ educational credentials, date of
hire and subject matter taught. Defendant objects to the request as
burdensome and cumulative, and it also raises privacy concerns on behalf
of its employees whose records would have to be revealed.
Issue #9: Defendant demands access to Plaintiff’s medical treatment
records, especially mental health records. In her Complaint, Plaintiff
sought damages for embarrassment, humiliation or the like, but in her
deposition, Plaintiff said her damage claim included loss for trouble
sleeping as the result of her termination. Judges and students are
instructed that the appellate courts in the jurisdiction have not ruled on
the exact contours of a waiver of mental health treatment records when
the plaintiff seeks emotional damages, and that the proper law is a matter
of first impression.
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